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Gunnar Lagergren*

Iran

-
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Claims Tribunal**
I.

Introduction

On 1 July 1981, at the Peace Palace in The Hague, I had the privilege
of declaring open the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, which had
been constituted in accordance with the Declarations made by the
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, on 19
January 1981, and adhered to by Iran and the United States of America.
As I observed at that time, two great nations had, by agreeing to peaceful
settlement of their differences through arbitration, brought to an end a
crisis of unique complexity which might well have become a threat to
world peace.
I had experienced a similar situation when India and Pakistan on 30
June 1965 agreed on an immediate cease-fire in termination of hostilities
in the Rann of Kutch area and soon afterwards decided to have recourse
to arbitration.
It would be helpful, by way of background, to recall a few of the
events which preceded the Declarations of Algiers. We all know of the
massive U.S. infiltration of Iran during the last years of the Shah's reign.
Political and economic leaders in the U.S. and the Shah found a common
interest in transforming -

too quickly -

Iran into a modern

industrialized state and in building a sophisticated defence system capable
of watching the Soviet Union. All this and the growing despotism in Iran,
supported by the odious secret police, SAVAK, led to wide spread
indignation in many circles. In the autumn of 1978, disturbances, strikes
and anti-American incidents became more and more frequent in Iran. On
16 January 1979, the Shah left Iran never to return. The Islamic
Revolution which forced him to relinquish his power claimed complete
victory on 1I February 1979.

*Gunnar Lagergren, Former President of the Tribunal and Former President of the Court of
Appeals for Western Sweden.
**This paper is an anticipated further development of my previous article on the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal, published in Realism in Law-Making, essays on internationallaw in
honour of Willem Riphagen, T.M.C. Asser Institute, The Hague, 1986. The Institute has kindly
granted permission to use parts of the earlier article. Several footnotes to these parts have,

however, now been omitted.
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At the end of October 1979 the deposed Shah arrived in the United
States for medical treatment in a New York hospital. Seeing the Shah's
reception by the United States as an act of provocation, militant students
seized the US Embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979, taking a large
number of diplomats and other US citizens as hostages. In exchange for
the release of the hostages, the students demanded that the Shah be
returned to Iran. On 14 November 1979, President Carter in retaliation
froze Iranian assets in the United States banks, at home and overseas,
valued at some 12 billion dollars.
Two United Nations Security Council resolutions later called on Iran
to release the hostages.
Ruling on an application made by the United States, the International
Court of Justice, initially by an order of 15 December 1979 and later
through its final judgment of 24 May 1980, found that Iran had violated
its obligation to the United States under international law to protect US
diplomatic and consular personnel. The Court called for the immediate
termination of the detention of Embassy personnel and for reparation to
be made to the United States for injury caused to it by these events. Iran
took no part in the proceedings. Despite intense diplomatic activity and
one abortive military episode (24-25 April 1980), aimed at bringing
about the release of the hostages, it took the death of the Shah (Cairo, 27
July 1980), the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980 and the
mediation of a friendly power, to end the captivity of the 52 hostages,
444 days after it began.
Negotiations to end the crisis were conducted through intermediaries.
No Iranian official would, for political reasons, meet with any American
official. The process was an extremely complex one and has been
described as unique in legal history. In the event, when the first plane
carrying the hostages left Tehran, President Reagan had been in office for
about 45 minutes and Mr. Carter was not able to welcome the 52
hostages at Wiesbaden as President of the United States.
II.

The Algiers Declarations

The principal terms of the final settlement were contained in two
Declarations of 19 January 1981 made by the Government of Algeria.
One of the Declarations set forth certain general principles and the basic
commitments each party was willing to make in order to resolve the
crisis, and is often given the short title "General Declaration"; the other,
concerning the settlement of claims, is often called the "Claims
Settlement Declaration".
The General Declaration records the central commitments of the
Parties: in exchange for Iran's undertaking to release the hostages, the
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United States would ensure the free transfer of all Iranian assets held in
the US banking system for the payment of specified Iranian debts and the
return of the remainder to Iran. Restoration of the financial status of Iran
was, however, no longer a mere matter of revoking the order freezing its
assets. Following the Revolution, some 450 claims had been filed in
United States courts against Iran and a substantial portion of Iran's frozen
assets had been attached in these judicial proceedings. These judicial
attachments had to be nullified. Iran and the United States also agreed
that the court proceedings should be brought to an end, and that
alternative means for adjudication of pending claims by United States
nationals against Iran and its state enterprises should be provided for.
Accordingly, the General Delcaration provides that the United States
"agrees to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving
claims of United States persons and institutions against Iran and its State
enterprises, to nullify all attachments and judgments obtained therein, to
prohibit all further litigation based on such claims, and to bring about the
termination of such claims through binding arbitration."
The Claims Settlement Declaration establishes the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal as the mechanism for bringing about "binding thirdparty arbitration", and declares that
"Claims referred to the Arbitral Tribunal shall ... be considered excluded
from the jurisdiction of the courts of Iran, or of the United States, or of any
other court."'
With a view to implementing these provisions the President of the
United States required federal courts to suspend prosecution of all claims
over which the Tribunal had jurisdiction. Many American companies
complained bitterly, claiming that revocation of the order freezing Iran's
assets amounted to payment of a ransom at their expense. Following
challenges of the President's action by claimants in several courts, the
United States Supreme Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan concluded the day after the inauguration of the Tribunal - that the President of the
United States did have the authority to dissolve pre-judgment
attachments as well as to suspend claims pending in United States courts.
The Justices of the Supreme Court emphasized the narrowness of their
decision. They also stated:
"Where the settlement of claims has been determined to be a necessary
incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute ...
we are not
prepared to say that the President lacks the power to settle such claims."

1. Article VI, paragraph 2.
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However, the Supreme Court also added the following sentence:
"being overly sanguine about the chances of United States claimants
before the Claims Tribunal would require a degree of naivety which
should not be demanded even of judges."
The financial arrangements for implementing the Algiers Declarations
were contained in several inter-related agreements among the central
banks of Iran, the United States, Algeria, the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands. The arrangements are very complex, and it is not my
intention to go into them in detail here. Suffice it to say that the banks
became the preferred creditors and at the outset only about 2.88 billion
dollars were transferred to Iran. However, it is important to note that 1
billion dollars were to be placed in a special Security Account, held in
escrow by the Central Bank of Algeria, and intended for the payment of
awards made by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal to United States
claimants. Iran agreed to replenish this Account when necessary in order
to maintain a minimum balance of 500 million dollars. This obligation
has been faithfully fulfilled. I believe it would be correct to view the
Security Account as having been established as a countervailing measure
following nullification of attachments in the United States.
Structureand Procedureof the Tribunal
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal consists of nine members three appointed by Iran, three by the United States, and three selected
"by mutual agreement" by the six party-appointed members. One of the
third-country members is to be appointed president of the Tribunal. By
agreement of the two Governments, the seat of the Tribunal was
established at The Hague.
The history of international arbitration shows that serious difficulties
may arise in connection with the appointment or replacement of neutral
members of a tribunal. Accordingly, the applicable UNCITRAL-Rules,
as modified by the Tribunal (i.e. "the Tribunal Rules") provide that if the
normal appointment mechanism does not function, either Government
may request the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
to designate an "appointing authority". He has done so, the then
President of the Supreme Court of Netherlands, Judge Charles Moons,
being so designated. Judge Moons has twice been required to make
appointments of third-country members, and has, on one occasion, been
called upon to select the president from among the three third-country
members.
Another function of the appointing authority is to decide challenges of
members made pursuant to Articles 9-12 of the Tribunal Rules. Thus far
Judge Moons has had, in two instances, to interpret and apply those
provisions.
III.

The Iran-United States Claim Tribunal

When first constituted, the Tribunal comprised the following: as thirdcountry members, Pierre Bellet, former Chief Justice of France, Nils
Mangard, former Judge of the Sbea Court of Appeals and President of
the Swedish National Board for Consumer Complaints, and myself,
former President of the Court of Appeals for Western Sweden; as Iranian
members, Mahmoud Kashani, Shafie Shafeiei and Seyed H. Enayat; and
as United States members, Howard M. Holtzmann, George H. Aldrich
and Richard M. Mosk.
After the inaugural session, the nine members had to deal with some
formidable problems: they had no common language, and no staff, and
yet, under the Algiers Declarations were required to begin receiving
claims by 20 October 1981, or within some ten weeks. A bilingual
Secretariat, including a claims Registry, had to be set up, and the
prospective parties had to be informed of the formalities that would be
required of them when filing claims and responding to them. It was
decided that each claim should be presented in both English and Persian,
12 (now 20) copies of each document being required in each language.
The rules for filing written pleadings were formulated in considerable
detail, even the size of the paper being prescribed - a point of practical
importance, when one realizes that there were thousands of documents to
be dealt with.
At the kind invitation of the Bureau of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, the Tribunal began work, including the receipt of claims, at
the Court's premises in the Peace Palace. In order to protect the serene
Palace from sudden invasion by parties, counsel and freight agents
bearing boxes of documents, the Tribunal declared that the date of filing
would confer no priority on a claim.
During the 3-month filing period the Registry received, filed and later
served on the respondents some 4,000 claims, composed of some 3,000
claims of less than 250,000 dollars and about 1,000 larger claims. An
early decision by the Tribunal in case No. A/2 held, that while it was
competent to decide claims of nationals of the United States against Iran
and of Iranian nationals against the United States, it did not have
jurisdiction over claims by Iran against United States nationals. This
decision resulted in the immediate withdrawal by Iran of 1,330 claims,
which were thus never served on the respondents.
In due course, the Tribunal moved from the Peace Palace to its own
building, which was appropriately equipped and well secured against the
use of force to disrupt proceedings. When I left the Tribunal on 30
September 1984, having served as its president for over three years, it had
a staff of over 80 persons, comprising legal assistants, Registry officers,
language specialists and administrative personnel, drawn from 17
nationalities and headed by a Secretary-General, Ambassador
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Christopher Pinto of Sri Lanka. The expenses of the Tribunal, at that time
approximately 4 million dollars (now somewhat over 5 million)
annually, are borne equally by the two Governments.
While the claims were being received by the Registry, the nine
members were occupied with preparing the Tribunal Rules. These
deliberations were necessarily time-consuming and complex. One byproduct of the process was that persons of diverse cultural, linguistic and
legal background learned to work together as a unit in the performance
of the Tribunal's delicate task.
In accordance with the Claims Settlement Declaration, the members
decided to sit either as the "Full Tribunal" or in chambers, each chamber
comprising one member appointed by each Government and one thirdcountry member, who would act as chairman. Disputes between the two
Governments relating to the interpretation or application of the Algiers
Declarations were to be brought before the Full Tribunal, which would
also deal with important issues of principles referred to it by a chamber.
A chamber would also relinquish jurisdiction to the Full Tribunal if a
majority decision could not be reached or if the resolution of an issue
might result in inconsistent decisions.
The Tribunal Rules provide for four stages of written pleadings:
Statement of Claim, Statement of Defence, Reply and Rejoinder. In
many cases the Tribunal invites the parties to a pre-hearing conference for
the purpose of defining the issues and preparing the hearing. Finally, if
the case cannot be decided on the documents before the Tribunal, a
hearing will be held. As Judge Holtzmann once observed, 2 a striking
aspect of the Tribunal's procedure is the very short hearings that are held
even in complex cases. Cases which would consume months of hearings
in other arbitral forums or in most national courts, are heard by the
Tribunal in a few days. Short hearings have been made possible by long
papers. The Tribunal encourages extensive exchanges of written
arguments and evidence before a hearing, and documents are the
principal source of evidence. It is noteworthy that the Tribunal does not
normally admit time-consuming objections to questions put to witnesses.
It tries to assess the weight of a statement by a witness, bearing in mind
the question put to him. On the basis, inter alia, of Scandinavian
concepts, the Tribunal makes a distinction between persons with an
interest in a claim (for instance individual claimants and senior officials
of corporate claimants) and those who are independent. The former do
not take the oath, are permitted to be present throughout the proceedings,
and may be questioned at any time. The true witnesses remain outside the
hearing room except when testifying.
2. Some Lessons of the Iran-UnitedStates Claims Tribunal § 16.05, 1988.
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As to the proceedings, a natural compromise was reached: hearings are
held in camera, but awards and other decisions are, as a rule, made
available to the public. They are reproduced, inter alia,in the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal Reports (Iran-U.S.C.T.R.), published by Grotius
Publications, Cambridge, England.
Following common law and Scandinavian practice, the Tribunal Rules
provide that any arbitrator may request that his dissenting or concurring
opinion, be recorded.
One memorable discussion concerned a request by the Iranian
members that the Tribunal's awards should be preceded by the words "In
the name of God". In opposing the request, other members pointed out
that the award could often comprise a majority as well as a minority
opinion. By way of compromise it was agreed that while awards should
not be preceded by that phrase, the Iranian members would be free to
include it above their signatures.
IV. Decisionsof the Tribunal
Since the Tribunal adopted its rules of procedure, established its
administrative infrastructure and began the adjudication of claims, it has
handed down awards and other decisions dealing with a wide range of
issues, and it would be impossible to attempt any comprehensive
description of them in the present study. I would like, however, to
mention a few significant decisions.
Under the Tribunal Rules the Tribunal is empowered to "decide ex
aequo et bono only if the arbitrating parties have expressly and in writing
authorized it to do so." Thus far no case has been so decided. However,
it should be noted that in its decisions the Tribunal has often referred with regard to procedural matters to its "inherent power", and with
regard to substantive matters to "equity", "fairness" and "justice".
The Claims Settlement Declaration gives the Tribunal jurisdiction over
claims "arising out of debts, contracts ... expropriations or other
measures affecting property rights." It is also empowered to hear certain
official claims of one Government against the other "arising out of
contractual arrangements between them for the purchase and sale of
goods and services"; and to decide certain bank claims. All awards of the
Tribunal are final and binding. A claim of less than 250,000 dollars is in
principle presented by the claimant's Government (as counsel) while
claims of 250,000 dollars or more are to be presented by the claimants
themselves.3
The provision of different modes for the presentation of claims has
given rise to arguments as to the extent to which the two Governments
3. Nasser Esphahanianv. Bank Tejerat, 2 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 165.
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are exercising diplomatic protection in the proceedings before the
Tribunal. In the decision of 6 April 1984, in case A/18, the Tribunal held
that
"it is the rights of the claimant, not of his nation, that are to be determined
by the Tribunal. This should be contrasted with the situation of espousal
of claims in international law ... where claims are esposued by a State at
its discretion..."
In this same case the Tribunal also emphasized that it was "clearly an
international tribunal established by treaty... and not an organ of a third
State. .. 5
In this context, I would like to mention that since the Tribunal
possesses the character of an international tribunal, governed by public
international law, it does not apply any national (for instance, Dutch)
conflict of laws rules, but instead applies general principles of conflict of
6
laws.
It might be added here that the Netherlands Government has
recognized the legal status and capacity of the Tribunal as a legal person
and has accorded it and its members and staff, privileges and immunities
7
comparable to those accorded to other intergovernmental organizations.
The Tribunal Rules empower the Tribunal at the request of either
party to take any interim measures it deems necessary. The Tribunal has
in this connection stated that it has inherent power to issue such orders

4. 5 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 261-262.
5. Ibid. See also Bendone-DerossiInternationalv. The Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, 6 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 133.
6. See Economy Forms Corporationv. The Government of the Republic of Iran et a, 3 IranU.S.C.T.R. 47-48 (applying the center of gravity doctrine) and Harnischfeger Corporationv.
The [Iranian]Ministry of Roads and Transportationet aL, 7 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 99 (applying the
"most significant connection" doctrine).
7. See, in this respect, the decision of the European Commission of Human Rights on 12
December 1988, in the case of Ary v. The Netherlands, accepting the Tribunals' immunity
from the jurisdiction of the Dutch courts in a case concerning the dismissal of a former
Tribunal employee. In spite of all this, and the overriding provision in Article VII, paragraph
2, of the Claims Settlement Convention, cited at supra note 1, there exists no unanimous
opinion whether or not the arbitral process before the Tribunal (including its awards) are
subject to interference by national courts. Whatever it might be of interest to mention that in
1958 both the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany and the European
Commission of Human Rights denied jurisdiction over decisions rendered by the Supreme
Restitution Court (now in Munich), an allied-German court dealing with claims by Nazi
victims against the Federal Republic for compensation etc.
A thorough and imaginative analysis of the "nature" of the Tribunal is now to be found in
David D. Caron, "The nature of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the evolving
structure of international dispute resolution" (1990), 4 Am. J Int. Law 104. Caron's conclusion
is that the arbitral proceedings before the Tribunal, at least those involving claims of nationals,
are governed by the legal system of the Netherlands.
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as may be necessary to conserve the rights of the parties before it and to
give effect to its own decisions, and further, that any award issued by it
will necessarily prevail over any inconsistent decision rendered by Iranian
or United States courts. Thus, the Tribunal, on occasion, formally
requested the Government of Iran, as a matter of international obligation,
to take all appropriate measures to ensure that Iranian court proceedings
be stayed until parallel proceedings before the Tribunal had been
completed. Similarly in an interlocutory award of 1984 the Tribunal
urgently requested
"the Government of the United States of America to take all necessary and
appropriate measures to prevent the sale of Iran's diplomatic and consular
properties in the United States which possess important historical, cultural
or other unique features, and which, by their nature, are irreplaceable." 8
Many of the Tribunal's decisions relate to a determination of its
jurisdiction. Thus, the Tribunal has been called upon to determine
whether forum selection clauses in contracts forming the basis of claims
before the Tribunal would have the effect of placing such claims outside
the Tribunal's jurisdiction because of the wording of the Claims
Settlement Declaration which excludes claims
"arising under a binding contract ...specifically providing that any

disputes thereunder shall be within the sole jurisdiction of the competent
Iranian courts..."
In a series of interlocutory awards made on 5 November 1982, the
Full Tribunal decided nine cases involving a total of 19 forum selection
clauses. The Tribunal preferred not to address the question of whether the
forum selection clauses (or the contracts) at issue were binding because
of the fundamental changes that had occurred in Iran after the signing of
the Algiers Declarations (or the conclusion of the contracts). The
Tribunal concluded that it had not been granted a clear mandate to
determine the "binding" nature of the forum selection clauses. Professor
Lowenfeld, who has closely followed the jurisprudence of the Tribunal,
thinks it came up with a good solution. "A general holding that the courts
of Iran were unfair, or were unable to provide justice for American
claimants, would inevitably poison the atmosphere in The Hague." He
added that it was important for the cause of international arbitration that
one of the American arbitrators, George Aldrich, shared the view of the
majority on this point. The Full Tribunal thereupon closely analyzed the
clauses, requiring explicit and unequivocal contractual language in order
to oust the Tribunal's jurisdiction. As a result, neither the American
claimants nor the Iranian respondents prevailed completely.
8. 5 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 133.
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Questions of nationality are of special significance in determining the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Claims Settlement Declaration defines
the term "national" of Iran or the United States as - in the case of an
individual, a citizen of either country and, in the case of corporations or
other legal entities, those organized under the laws of either country if
citizens of that country hold, directly or indirectly, an interest in such
corporation or entity equivalent to fifty per cent or more of its capital
stock. While a birth certificate, a passport or a naturalization certificate
might suffice to prove the citizenship of an individual, proving the
nationality of a corporation - and in particular the nationality of a large,
public company - will clearly be a complex, time-consuming and
expensive procedure. Recognizing this problem, Chamber One, after
much study and debate, has developed guidelines for proof of corporate
nationality for multinational corporations, based on certain presumptions
and generally available corporate documents.
These guidelines, have been accepted by the other Chambers as well.
They are set forth in the Flexi-Van and GeneralMotors cases.
In the case A/18 Iran requested the Full Tribunal to interpret the
definition of the term "national" in the Claims Settlement Declaration
and to state whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction over claims against
Iran filed by persons who, during the relevant period were Iranian
citizens under Iranian law, and United States citizens under United States
law. The issue was a deeply emotional one for Iran, and could affect
jurisdictional questions in approximately 330 claims, half of which
belong to the larger claims above 250,000 dollars. Iran asserted the
principle of absolute non-responsibility of a state for claims by its own
citizens. However, the Tribunal in its decision of 6 April 1984 held that
it was
"satisfied that, whatever the state of the law prior to 1945, the better rule
at the time the Algiers Declarations were concluded and today is the rule
of dominant and effective nationality."
In so holding, the Tribunal pointed to the "pervasive effect" on the issue
of the Nottebohm and Mergi decisions. The Full Tribunal then concluded
its analysis with a statement placing the issue of dual nationality within
the context of modern concerns for individual rights:
"[The] trend toward modification of the [1930] Hague Convention rule of
non-responsibility by search for the dominant and effective nationality is
scarcely surprising as it is consistent with the contemporaneous
development of international law to accord legal protection to individuals,
even against the State of which they are nationals."
The Tribunal added that it would, in order to determine the dominant
and effective nationality of a claimant "consider all relevant factors,
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including habitual residence, center of interests, family ties, participation
in public life and other evidence of attachment."
In report, No. 5, of 1988, published by the Raoul Wallenberg Institute
of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law at the University of Lund, I
discussed five cases on nationalisation of foreign property. The five cases
dealt with are known by their short titles INA, Starrett,Foremost,SeaLand and Flexi-Van. The standard of compensation for expropriated
property in international law was discussed in general terms in the award
in INA, and in particular in the two separate opinions and the dissenting
opinion filed with it. In the Starrett case, governmental control of
privately owned property was found to have reached the point at which
it amounted to expropriation, and compensation was ordered under the
Treaty of Amity between Iran and the United States of 1955, as "lex
specialis'"The Tribunal applied there the test of "fair market value" and
utilized - in a short-time projection - the "Discounted Cash Flow
Method". In Foremost the majority reached the conclusion that
governmental interference with Foremost's property, while not
amounting to expropriation prior to the Tribunal's jurisdictional cut-off
date, 19 January 1981, still gave rise to a right to compensation for the
temporary loss of enjoyment of the property in question. Relying on post
cut-off events, Foremost has revived its action based on expropriation
before a federal judge in the District of Columbia (see, Iranian Assets
Litigation Reporter, 28 April 1989, at 17158-59). A majority of the
Chamber in Sea-Land, while concluding that the evidence was
insufficient to justify a finding that expropriation had occurred, upheld an
alternative claim for compensation on the basis of unjust enrichment.
Finally, in Flexi-Van the Chamber held that the mere assumption of
governmental control over two corporations, leaving a substantial
freedom in the corporations in their day to day activities, did not
constitute expropriation of rights associated with contracts entered into
by those corporations, concluding in addition, that there had been no
interference or unjust enrichment requiring compensation.
In the months leading up to the Revolution in February 1979 and
during the following months until the summer of 1979, the situation in
Iran, at least in the major cities, was characterized by strikes, riots and
other civil strife. This situation has given the Tribunal the unique
opportunity to review many cases from the point of view of suspension
of contracts, the existence of force majeure and termination of contracts
by reason of impossibility or frustration.9

9. See, for instance, Queens Office Tower Associates v. Iran NationalAirlines Corp., 2 IranU.S.C.T.R. 247; Gould Marketing, Inc. v. The Ministry of National Defence of Iran, 3 Iran-
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The Claims Settlement Declaration, Article II, paragraph 1, gives the
Tribunal jurisdiction over any counterclaim "which arises out of the same
contract, transaction or occurrence that constitutes the subject matter" of
the claim. At the beginning, this provision gave rise to many discussions
with respect to counterclaims based on unpaid taxes and social insurance
premiums. The Tribunal finally concluded that such counterclaims (other
than withholding taxes specified in a contract or applied by the parties in
practice) do not fall within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. The Tribunal has
decided that such counterclaims arise by operation of the relevant tax and
social insurance laws and not out of the contract. The Tribunal has also
added that the same jurisdictional approach should apply for the purpose
of a set-off. It has also been stated by the Tribunal that tax laws are
manifestations ofjus imperii which [without treaty provisions] cannot be
extraterritorially enforced, and the Claims Settlement Declaration
contains no provisions for such enforcement. The Tribunal has further
observed that revenue laws are typically complex, so much that their
enforcement is frequently assigned to specialized courts or administrative
agencies.10

Problems, which often recur, concern questions of interest and costs.
As to the rate of interest a court or a tribunal possesses a certain margin
of appreciation for the balancing of rights involved. In the absence of a
contractually stipulated rate, the Tribunal has exercised this discretion,
applying rates varying from 8.5 percent to 12 percent. Chamber One
(under the chairmanship of Professor Boeckstiegel) has tried to formulate
a uniform rule (for a successful American claimant), that is, the "average
rate of interest paid on six-month certificates of deposit in the United
States" during the relevant period." Judge Holtzmann proposed in the
same case that it would be more appropriate to base the Tribunal's
interest rate on the prime rate during the relevant period. 2
Interest has been calculated, for instance, from the "date of breach",
from the "date of substantiation", from "the date the claim was filed" or
from "30 days after the date on which the claim was filed". In cases of
nationalisation, interest has been calculated from the date of taking.
However, the chairman, in footnote 63 of the final award in the case of

U.S.C.TR. 147; Questech, Inc. v. The Ministry ofNationalDefence of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, 9 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 107; Touche Ross and Company, a Partnershipv. The Islamic Republic
of Iran,9 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 284.
10. See, Howard Needles Tommen & Bergenhoff v. The Government of the Islamic Republic
ofIran etaL, 11 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 317-319.
11. Sylvonia Technical Systems Inc. v. the Government of the IslamicRepublic of Iran,8 IranU.S.C.T.R. 320-322.
12. Ibid, at 321.
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Starrett, added that the said practice "does not necessarily reflect the
existence of any general obligation in current international law to make
payment of compensation immediately on the date of taking.
Accordingly, it might be reasonable to allow interest to run only from the
date or dates (in case of payments in installments) on which the
13
compensation was to be paid.'
Chamber One, in its award of 27 June 1985 in the case of Sylvania
Technical Systems summarized the Tribunal's practice as to costs as
follows: "The Tribunal has not awarded costs in all cases, and even when
it has, the amounts have generally been less than claimed. Chamber Two
has never awarded any costs, Chamber One has awarded relatively small
amounts of costs in only a few cases, and Chamber Three has in general
awarded costs to the successful party in an amount well below the one
claimed, using a range between $5,000 and $25,000 with cost of $70,000
awarded in one case. No distinction has been made between costs for
legal representation and assistance and other costs, where costs were
14
awarded."
It may be noted that the United States members of Chambers One and
Three (being practising lawyers from the United States) at least at the
outset usually favoured the award of higher amounts as costs than did the
West European chairmen.
V. Conclusion
The Tribunal is unique in many ways. It is unique in the manner of its
creation - an element in a series of interlocking conditions negotiated
under severe pressure of time. It is unique in that two nations between
which nothing but suspicion remained, two nations culturally utterly
distinct from one another, could come together in a long-term endeavour
aimed at the orderly resolution of disputes on the basis of "respect for
law".
I would like in this context to cite the following statement in the
concurring opinion of Judge Hamid Bahrami-Ahmadi of 4 September
1986 in the case A/15 before the Full Tribunal: "We must always have
in mind the fact that a noble, revolutionary Government has, under the
most critical circumstances, expressed its willingness to settle its disputes
by legal means, on the basis of international law, by having agreed to
establish this Tribunal. The manner in which we deal with the issues
confronting us can either encourage others to place their reliance on
13. StarrettHousing Corporationet al v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 16
Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 234.
14. Supra note 11, at 324.
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international courts, or discourage them from doing so. Past events
always light the way for those who follow."
While not perhaps unique with regard to the numbers of claims
submitted to it (the United States-Mexican General Claims Commission
received some 3,600 claims, and the United States-German Mixed
Claims Commission established after World War I, received some
20,000), the amounts involved in the claims before the Tribunal are
unprecedented. The total value of the claims filed with the Tribunal is of
the order of some tens of billion of dollars. In addition there are
counterclaims reaching very high, but the figures are hitherto unknown.
It is hardly appropriate for me, as the first president of this Tribunal,
to try to assess its progress thus far in terms of "success" or "failure". It
will be for history to make these judgments. However, it is common
knowledge that one of the Governments and more especially individual
claimants from one country find the pace of the Tribunal slow.
Correspondingly, the other Government, deeply affected by revolution
and war finds the pace of the Tribunal too fast. On the third-country
arbitrators, and on the president in particular, devolves the onerous and
thankless task of steering a firm, just and unruffled course between haste
and endless delays.
The Tribunal represents a noble endeavour by two great nations to
resolve bitter and potentially explosive controversies by peaceful and
rational means. It is an endeavour fraught with innumerable difficulties of
unprecedented complexity for those appointed to achieve this high
purpose, demanding patience, firmness, good humour and a strong
constitution. But I believe I speak for all my colleagues, members of the
Tribunal past and present, in saying that we have felt privileged to be a
part of it.
Two American lawyers wrote in the spring of 1984:
"As an institution, the Tribunal represent a considerable achievement,
operating in many respects at a substantial level of organization and
competence. On the other hand, there remain potentially serious threats to
the just and expeditious resolution of the many claims which are still
pending."15
Premonitory signs were the occurrence from time to time of
unorthodox, intense discussions within the Tribunal and the habit of
many national arbitrators of "letting off steam" in their publicly available
separate opinions.

15. Selby, Jamison M. and Stewart, Daniel P. "Practical Aspects of Arbitrating Claims before
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal" (1984), International Lawyer 243.
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With regard to the disorderly events which occurred on 3 September
1984, shortly before the effective date of my resignation, and the instant
suspension of essential parts of the Tribunal's activities, I wish to refer to
my article, mentioned in note 1, Realism in Law-Making.16
Many proposals and suggestions were presented in good faith to
resolve these temporary problems. Finally, on January 15, 1985 the
activities of the Tribunal were fully resumed.
The interruption imposed on the Tribunal's activities gave everyone
concerned time for reflection, and one may say that today the Tribunal
continues its mission with cautious speed. As of 1 July, 1989, 775 large
cases and 382 claims of less than $250,000 have by award, award on
agreed terms or other decision been brought to an end. My estimate is
that the Tribunal ought to have discharged its mandate within three years,
or earlier, if lumpsum agreements will be concluded.
In making that estimate, I take into account the fact that a number of
cases continue to be settled on agreed terms. To date, more than 1.5
billion dollars (excluding huge amounts of interest to be calculated by the
Escrow Agent) have changed hands pursuant to the Tribunal's awards,
including awards on agreed terms, with about two-thirds of that amount
going to United States claimants.
No one would disagree, I think, that when the Tribunal's last award
will have been signed, an important chapter in the history of international
arbitration would be closed.
Stockholm, August 1989.

16. Supra note 1,at 127-130.

